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Leon Lipson*
Piety and Revision: How Will the
Mandarins Survive Under
the Rule of Law?
I would like to say something today about the rule of the Party, about
constitutional reforms and the rule of law, and about the mandarins and
the way they have coped. We must recognize stunning accomplishments
in the last several years in Soviet public life. Those that go under the
heading of glasnost are already fairly familiar to most of you: the Soviet
Union's loosening hold on eastern Europe; the repudiation of the
Brezhnev Doctrine (never so-called by Brezhnev) that a country once
gone socialist must be protected even against its will from going some-
where other than socialist; other confessions of error that were conspic-
uously lacking in the style of Soviet leadership in the past, like
confessions that Stalin had made errors and confessions about the
period of stagnation (zastoi); accomplishments within the legal system,
some of which have been mentioned,1 some of which will be enumer-
ated tomorrow, 2 and some of which I shall describe, though very briefly,
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1. Presentations by Igor N. Belousovitch and Robert Sharlet, Cornell International
Law Journal Symposium, Perspectives on the Legal Perestroika: Soviet Constitutional and
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Belousovitch, The New Soviet Parliament: Process, Procedures, and Legislative Priority, 23
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 275 (1990); Sharlet, Party and Public Ideals in Conflict: Constitutional-
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in a little while.
Problems? Yes. Problems remain, arise, abound. A Soviet policy
maker with sufficiently broad jurisdiction would have to agree that she
or he faced grave problems in - to compile an incomplete list, organ-
ized alphabetically - agriculture, alcoholism, cooperatives, corrective
labor colonies, corruption, credits, crime, emigration, ideology, mar-
kets, military morale, nationalities, party unity, the press, political uses
of psychiatry, the ruble, the satellite countries (as they used to be
called), shortages, the role of the soviets, unemployment, and trade
unions. And many of these problems, of course, encompass large and
painful sub-problems. Yet some things are happening, as the two grace
notes you heard before have pointed out;3 progress is uneven, contra-
dictory, sometimes retrograde, and fragmentary.
I. The Role of President Gorbachev in Soviet Reforms
The role of Mr. Gorbachev in this is rather curious. You have read, and
some of you have written, more than needs to be rehearsed here. I will
throw out one little observation, which in some ways is consistent with
Mr. Sharlet's observation earlier about the question of Gorbachev's
blueprint.4
My impression is that when Mr. Gorbachev started out he had some
second-order principles but not many first-order principles. As for the
latter, I think, he has, unlike most politicians under the pressures of
office, become more principled with time rather than less. His second-
order principle was to assemble around him and encourage and foster
large numbers of earnest, bright if possible, aspiring, young followers,
adherents, allies, and collaborators and let them fight it out, let them
struggle, see what would fly and what would not, and gradually become
attached to some of those ideas and detached from some others.
HI. Shifts in the Rule of the Party: How Much Is Going On and What
Is Not
From the standpoint of the outside observer or one who wishes the
Soviet people, the Russians, and other peoples well, the shift in the rule
of the Party is in many ways a promising development. It looks, at long
last, as though someone has taken to heart the magnificent, bitterjest of
one of Brecht's characters, who says somewhere, "This government has
lost the confidence of the people, we'll have to elect a new people."
3. Belousovitch Presentation, supra note 1; Sharlet Presentation, supra note 1; see
also Belousovitch, The New Soviet Parliament, supra note 1; Sharlet, Party and Public Ideals
in Conflict, supra note 1.
4. Sharlet Presentation, supra note 1; see also Sharlet, Party and Public Ideals in
Conflict, supra note 1, at 352. For a discussion of whether Gorbachev had a plan for
his legal reforms from the outset, see Roundtable Discussion, Crises in the USSR: Are
the Constitutional and Legislative Changes Enough?, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 378, 380-84
(1990).
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What started the shift I do not know; there were certainly many con-
tributing factors. One of them surely was the striking effect of the elec-
tion to the Congress of People's Deputies in March of last year. You will
probably recall that those seats available to public election, not reserved
for various organizations heavily dominated by the Party, were often lost
rather than won. That is, thanks to a provision in the electoral law that
required any candidate to obtain more than 50 percent of the votes in
order to be elected on the first run, and another provision that permit-
ted voters to cast null ballots by handing in a ballot with all names
crossed out, something like 98 or 99 candidates for the Congress of Peo-
ple's Deputies lost though there were no competing candidates.
Thus, the Soviet Union translated into literal truth a remark made
by the American ironist Mort Sahl. Sahl surfaced in 1980 after the
Carter-Reagan election and expressed in his way the idea that the elec-
tion had owed more to the voters' disenchantment with Carter than to
their approval of Reagan, by saying, "[I]f... [Reagan] had run unop-
posed he would have lost." 5 It was just that which happened to 98 or 99
candidates, unopposed, who lost in the Soviet Union. Many of them
were fat cats indeed: city Party secretaries, generals in the armed serv-
ices or their equivalent, enterprise managers, and other pillars of the
Soviet establishment.
Since then, as you all know, the Party, in at least the Plenum of the
Central Committee, has now proposed to countenance a revision of that
part of article 6 that had reserved the guiding role for the Party in the
Soviet Constitution. 6 But a great many inequalities and privileges
remain even if that revision, as we all suppose it will, goes through.
I have already mentioned the reserved seats in the Congress of Peo-
ple's Deputies for various civic organizations including, in the first and
biggest instance, the Party itself. Will that be dropped?
What about the nomenklatura? That word was used here earlier,
7
correctly but briefly. As perhaps some of you know, the nomenklatura in
its formal sense is a list of official posts, occupancy of which has to be
cleared with the appropriate organs of the Party. The incumbents do
not have to be Party members, though in fact almost all of them are, but
the nomination has to be cleared with the Party. And that nomenklatura
- the term is sometimes used for the list, sometimes for the collective of
individuals who occupy those posts - reaches quite far down in the
bureaucracy into the ministries, enterprises, institutes, collective farms
and the like. If the Communist Party ceases to have its monopoly
assured by the Constitution, and if in an election it loses, what will hap-
pen to the nomenklatura? To the victor belong the spoils? Or shall we
find that the nomenklatura then stands up in favor of civil service and
solidity of tenure? It is a complicated issue.
5. Ferretti, Mort Sahl, Intractable As Ever, Back in Town, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1981,
at C14, col. 3 (quoting Mort Sahl).
6. KONST. SSSR art. 6.
7. Belousovitch Presentation, supra note 1; Sharlet Presentation, supra note 1.
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Connected with it, of course, is the very personal, very important
problem of their perquisites, property, and privileges. As you know, dis-
parity in income and nominal inequalities of net worth are rather flatter
in the Soviet Union than they are in western countries. But inequality
in styles of life can be very considerable, and that difference is made up
largely of perquisites.
What will happen to those privileges, as they are called in certain
cases? Some of you may know the genre of Soviet anecdotes called
Radio Yerevan. Yerevan is the capital city of Armenia and Radio Yer-
evan is the name for a genre of stories, the basis for which is the legend
that on Radio Yerevan there is a question-and-answer program. The
public sends in questions, and the station operatives farm the questions
out to subject matter experts whose answers are then read out over the
air. This mythical program has on it, among others, the question, "Is it
really true that the Soviet people eat caviar?" and the answer is "Cer-
tainly, through their elected representatives." Well, what is going to
happen to that and many other delectable perquisites? We do not know.
What will happen, if the Party monopoly really goes, to accountabil-
ity for the undoubtedly enormous funds that are in the hands of Party
organizations? What will happen to the criminal law immunity that used
to be a privilege of Party membership? (Sometimes that immunity could
be removed by expulsion from the Party followed by prosecution in the
criminal way, that is, handing the expelled member over to the secular
arm to be burnt.) What will happen to the secrecy that has been such an
enormous benefit to the Party's maintenance of its monopoly in func-
tional, as well as formal ways? All of that is in the future, and the revi-
sion of article 6, while very important indeed, is a prelude.
M. Constitutional Reform and the Rule of Law
Several particular constitutional reforms and changes in the rule of law
are in the works. Many of them, as Mr. Sharlet noted,8 are changes that
were floated as proposals in 1956 through 1958, during the early
Khrushchev years. They did not succeed then, but they are being
revived. These changes include participation of defense counsel in
criminal cases at an earlier stage of the proceediags than before, instead
of making the counsel's participation await in most cases the conclusion
of the preliminary investigation; introduction of ajury system for certain
capital cases; and specific expression of the presumption of innocence,
though the question of the technical, as distinct from the symbolic, value
of that proposed change is one about which we could have some
discussion.
Mr. Belousovitch mentioned the reform of the law providing
redress to citizens who had been injured by illegal government official
8. Sharlet Presentation, supra note 1; see also Levitsky, The Restructuring of Per-
estroika, supra note 2, at 247-65.
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action.9 Before the reform, the then recent law establishing such
redress was limited to illegal governmental action committed by a single
official. If the action had been committed as a result of a collective deci-
sion, then all members of the collective were immune and no redress
was possible. The new law took care of that, or rather it is hoped that it
will take care of that.' 0
There may be more changes in the future, though that is less cer-
tain. One change might be in the system ofpropiska by which the Soviet
law enforcement officers and to some extent security police maintained
actual or potential control of the residence of a large number of citizens.
And yet, as this audience in such a setting as a great law school
knows, the law on the books and law in action are not the same thing.
Mr. Sharlet referred to article 125 of the old pre-Brezhnev Constitution,
which guaranteed among other things, freedom of assembly.'" Years
ago a certain zakonnik, a member of the legalist wing of the dissident
movement in defense of legal rights, was picked up and taken to a KGB
interrogator for a pre-arrest chat. (Getting ahead of my story, I should
tell you he was later indeed, duly arrested and served some time.) At the
pre-arrest chat he was told, "Look here, we know all about your criminal
activity, we haven't picked you up yet for specific reasons." Nobody
mentioned the specific reasons, which happened to be that he was the
grandson of a famous man and there would have been international
repercussions. "We haven't picked you up yet for specific reasons, but
that doesn't mean we don't know what you've been doing and I want to
warn you that unless you mend your ways and stop violating the law you
will find yourself in confinement."
He said, "[b]ut I don't agree that I've been violating the law. I have
been speaking out and assembling documentation on behalf of people
who were arrested and prosecuted for demonstrating and speaking out
in their turn against a policy of the Soviet government with which they
disagreed. And their right to do that is specifically guaranteed by article
125 of the Constitution of the USSR."
At which point the interrogator said, "Please, we're having a serious
conversation." The interrogator knew that law in the books and law in
action are not the same thing.
Other changes in the legal system? Mention has already been
made, and I would only like briefly to underscore it, of the institutional
needs. 12 There are too few courts, with too little powers, too thinly and
meagerly sustained with resources, and too few judges and lawyers. You
9. Belousovitch Presentation, supra note 1.
10. Id.; see also Hausmaninger, The Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR,
supra note 2, at 291 (discussion of constitutional review of adjudication of individual
citizens' complaints).
11. Sharlet Presentation, supra note 1; see Sharlet, Party and Public Ideals in Conflict,
supra note 1, at 344-52 (discussion of mechanisms of social control with examples).
12. Belousovitch Presentation, supra note 1; see also Belousovitch, The New Soviet
Parliament, supra note 1, at 280-81.
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have already heard something about the pulls and strains on the new
generation of deputies of the Congress or the Supreme Soviet'3 who
have to do a lot of drafting, revising, and plain legislative thinking with-
out a staff to speak of, without committee rooms, paper clips, carbon
paper, libraries, secretaries, or time. And there are more demands on
them from outside the Supreme Soviet. Of course, they must attend to
their constituents like legislators everywhere. But there are also the
interviews with Ogonyok, the fellowships in foreign research universities,
the opportunities for television exposure, and a lot of other heady,
attractive, distracting opportunities for them.
Along with a new discovery of separation of powers - not just divi-
sion of functions - we hear it asserted by many persons in and around
the Supreme Soviet that the Soviets (the legislative branch) should be
supreme. There is also the prospect of new battles between the execu-
tive and the legislative, inadequately refereed by the courts. So, much is
uncertain and much remains to be hoped for as well as done.
IV. How Much Can Be Expected from the Rule of Law in this
Situation?
A. The Proper Role of the State
Among the many sad contradictions of Soviet history is the contradic-
tion between the utopian prediction inherited from Engels, among
others, that under socialism the State would wither away, 14 and the
actual Soviet practice of strengthening and swelling the State beyond
the most extravagant imagination of czars or pharaohs. Proponents of
the rule of law, I suggest, should try not to let the principle of law and
order or the principle of due process of law be manipulated into an
instrument of executive, bureaucratic tyranny. In the service of that vig-
ilance they must sometimes assert an opposite paradox: that those who
govern are under an obligation to use the State's juridical machinery in
such a way as to restrain the State and restrain themselves, who are both
the masters and the servants of the people. That ought not be confused,
as often happens, with the claim that freedom under law is a favor
granted to the populace by those who are in charge of the State. It is
common to speak of legality as an attribute of the State, as in pravovoe
gosudarstvo (Rechtsstaat), but we ought to maintain, and I suggest the
Soviet people ought to maintain, not that the rights of the people are
bestowed by the State, but rather that the powers of the State are con-
ferred by the people. The people do not receive their rights but retain
and reserve them. That is, we should ask the State to take the ninth' 5
13. Belousovitch Presentation, supra note 1; see also Belousovitch, The New Soviet
Parliament, supra note 1, at 277-78.
14. See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 50 (D. Ryazanoff ed.
1963).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration ... of certain rights, shall not be
construed to den), or disparage others retained by the people.").
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and tenth amendments16 seriously. When State officials are made sub-
ject to juridical restraint, that restraint is not imposed by the grace of
those officials. It is a price exacted by the people in delegating the
power to govern, and it is part of the paradox of decent government.
In a country where the State reflects the wishes of a majority, per-
haps the most important task of the rule of law is protection of the rights
of political minorities, ethnic minorities, cultural dissenters, economi-
cally weak classes and others, against encroachment by today's majority
through the officials whom that majority has put into power. To name
two minor classes of persons who badly need such protection, we might
instance the whistle-blowers, who have observed illegal official conduct,
usually from inside large organizations, and courageously attempt to
bring their observations to the attention of officials up the line. One
knows how difficult their task is from many reports in Soviet newspa-
pers, from books like Konstantin Simis's USSR: The Corrupt Society, 17 and
others. And another class of persons badly in need of protection against
the majority are the sometimes unpleasant persons who are overly litig-
ious, who enjoy or are psychologically driven to use the machinery of
courts, ministries, deputies, procuracy, and other agencies of the law to
excess. Persons in both those classes need the benefit of the rule of law,
particularly at the very time that they invoke it. In some other respects,
against the background of Soviet history, it is equally urgent to secure
the rights of the majority against the bureaucracy. Reform of the electo-
ral laws, transition to a multiparty system, and emphasis on the role of
the Supreme and other soviets would contribute to such protection.
B. Constitutions and Institutions
I think it would be unwise to lay down a rule, even for a single state, for
or against a written constitution. The Soviet Union has a written consti-
tution now, although it is on the way toward erosion or revision, but I do
not think we should sit here and prescribe. There are several examples
of states in each category of written or unwritten constitutions with fairly
good records in the rule of law. A combination of particular statutes,
inveterate regulations, historical taboos, public morality, and social eti-
quette suffices to protect the rule of law in some states where, it could be
argued, a written constitution would perturb good old habits, produce
undesirable rigidity, or even provoke lawlessness.
When drawing up provisions to go into a written constitution, new
or amended, some jurists borrow from the experience of other coun-
tries. It has happened on many occasions, several of them just after the
end of the Second World War, that ex-colonies sought to adapt some
constitutional provisions, either of the former imperial metropolis or
more likely of a different country that was not stained with the colonial-
16. U.S. CONST. at amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
17. K. SIMIs, USSR: THE CORRUPT SOCIETY (1982).
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ist stigma locally but spoke the same language the mother country had.
Again, it seems fruitless to lay down a general rule for determining when
a borrowed provision can be well fitted into a second country and when,
on the contrary, it would do more harm than good despite excellent
operation in its native habitat.
We may tend, as lawyers, to put too much weight on particular for-
mal institutions. It is admirable to have learned the 18th-century les-
sons on separation of powers, but it does not follow that any specific
shape of legislative, executive or judicial institution is automatically to
be preferred. Like a constitutional norm, an institution that works in
one national setting may, when transplanted to another, perform a dif-
ferent function and have different advantages and shortcomings. The
work that one institution may usefully do in promoting the rule of law in
one given national setting may depend, for example, on local factors
such as the state of the legal profession, the condition of popular educa-
tion, the "law-consciousness of the people," to borrow a Russian term,
and the effectiveness of the systems of communication.
In states with genuine though incomplete separation of powers, var-
ious higher institutions of government often have control, oversight,
veto, or delaying power over one another. This is known in some coun-
tries as a system of checks and balances. The system imposes a cost in
reduced "efficiency," for it means that many decisions must be post-
poned or revised and that some issues which often are the most highly
charged, politically difficult, ticklish, zlobodnevnye issues may long persist
without being resolved by a clear cut victory for one institution, party or
faction. Countries that have suffered in the past from tyrannical or
oppressive "efficiency" are content to make such a sacrifice.
C. The Role of Lawyers in the Rule of Law
How prominent must lawyers as a profession be in a society that is seri-
ously committed to promoting the rule of law? It has been said about
war that it is too important to be left to the generals; we could perhaps
agree that the rule of law is too important to be left to lawyers.' 8 In
various parts of the world, circumstances of local history including polit-
ical ideology, ecclesiastical tradition, bureaucratic disputes, revolution-
ary upheavals, and economic organizations have thrown lawyers onto
the center of the stage and assigned to them roles that in other places or
in other times might have been filled by churchmen, orators, editors,
cultural anthropologists, or applied scientists. As in the United States,
the prominence of lawyers is reflected in jurists' numbers, income, and
political visibility, and in the strong opinions held of lawyers by the laity.
At their best, lawyers feel and act upon a special obligation to
uphold the rule of law: not only because thereby they protect their pro-
fessional aggrandizement or because they naturally support a mode of
public thought and action in which they feel easily adept, but because
18. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 4, at 394.
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their training and observation tell them that the common interest is
served by it. Perhaps this obligation is important enough to justify at
least a part of lawyers' privileges and wealth. But it all would count for
little if the society around them treated the laws and juridical activity as
mere ritual, or drama, or as a cover for the moves of the power holders.
The legal profession can do much, but by itself it cannot secure the rule
of law for a people who hold the law in contempt or consider law irrele-
vant to their most pressing doctrines. In the Soviet Union, the jury is
still out.
D. Limits to Our Expectations
I suggest that progress toward the rule of law will be made easier if we
understand that, important though it is, we cannot expect it to solve all
the problems of society or even all the problems of government. For
example, the rule of law understood in its procedural sense does not
necessarily entail a just society; it is possible to apply regular, general
procedures with certainty and fairness to carry out unjust policies. I
know that Lon Fuller used to say that the common law tended to work
itself pure, and procedural due process tended to work itself toward sub-
stantive due process if given time. But, it may take a longer time than
we all have. That concept of law as regular, general procedures without
that which ought to underlie it, was implicit in the translation of "rule of
law" that was used in Khrushchev's time, upravenie posredstvom prava, or
administration by means of law, emphasizing procedural regularity but
seeming to omit any reference to substantive justice.
Nor does the rule of law guarantee fairness or justice in families or
among friends or in the other large areas of social life that partly escape
juridical oversight in even the most litigious, law-ridden, or the most
totalitarian of societies. A sense of ethical responsibility may owe more
to custom, art, and religion than to the legal system.
To those who hold that human rights in the social and economic
spheres belong ahead of human rights in the political and civil area, the
rule of law may seem empty. It is true that the rule of law does not
guarantee social or economic progress, but we ought to bear in mind the
observation made some years ago by a thoughtful jurist that countries
where policies promoting equality had been preferred to policies pro-
moting freedom turned out to have achieved neither. For a good society
with imperfect human beings we can say that the rule of law is necessary,
though one ought not to arouse false hopes by insisting that it would be
sufficient.
E. All At Once or Little By Little
To make significant progress in promoting the rule of law in the Soviet
Union is a Herculean task, and it is not easy to imagine two rivers that
can be diverted into the stables for the cleaning. The Soviet jurist,
reflecting on 70 years of Soviet public life with its record of war, poverty,
dislocation, terror, stagnation, progress, upheaval, and reversals, must
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consider nearly three generations of interrelated phenomena that still
tend to reinforce one another. These phenomena include monopoly of
power, privilege, official posts, perquisites of office, control over entry
into and exit from government by the Party or its servants and followers;
monopoly of most of the lawful media of communication along with the
material resources necessary to their function; systematic secrecy; sup-
pression or distortion of statistical and other public information; routine
mendacity and pervasive hypocrisy in official and quasi-official state-
ments; disorder in the contents, arrangements, and accessibility of legis-
lative and regulative acts; frequent official disparagement of the value
and importance of the legal profession, discouraging recruitment and
cramping the material and personal resources put at the disposal of that
profession; deep-seated, far-ranging lawlessness on the part of State and
Party officials including those charged with the duty of enforcing the
laws on, for example, economic and other crimes; policies and practices
that necessarily have the effect of encouraging corruption throughout
the government and society; misuse and under-utilization of the soviets
at various levels; and frequent violation and mockery of the principle of
independence of the judiciary.
Within the past few years, as we have suggested, there have been
changes, some of them have been spectacular though not surely lasting.
At least, they have made an impression. Outside the Soviet Union - for
reasons that lie deep in the history of ideas, the history of socialism, and
in some places traditional attitudes toward Russia - the Soviet Union
systematically gets more credit for stopping what it should never have
started than it got blame for starting it in the first place. That is luck for
the Soviet Union.
It would be understandable, given the litany that I have just recited,
if one were to insist that reform could only be revolutionary and com-
prehensive on the ground that nothing can be done until everything is
done. In practice, however, piecemeal measures may do if they are con-
nected by a steadily maintained program, or at least a steadily regarded
vision of the entire horizon. That problem, which is both a strategic and
a moral problem, resembles the problems that have to be faced in deal-
ing with the wider issues ofperestroika, and like them it may yield to local
and current considerations of available resources and foreseeable risks.
Whether Gorbachev, the man who, if my analysis is correct, has been
developing principles as he went along, is nimble enough to manage this
is something we do not yet know.
As some of the preceding remarks of my colleagues pointed out,
time is needed for many things. There must be time to train the new
boys in economic management, to train the lawyers and judges, to train
deputies. There must be time to adjust expectations and claims so as
not to rub the noses of the losers in their loss. There must be time to
build a political culture, as Mr. Sharlet mentioned,' 9 and time to build
19. Sharlet Presentation, supra note 1.
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the economy. Years ago, it was a jest, regarded as mischievous, spiteful
and irresponsible, to say that, from the standpoint of the Cold War, we
ought to be grateful to the Bolsheviks for slowing down Russia's growth
rate. But, it turns out that there is something in this remark, statistically
speaking. Well, time is needed to build the economy back up and the
question becomes whether time is available.
V. Survival of the Soviet Mandarins
In the midst of all this, the power-holders have to cope with a change,
possibly in their own power, but certainly in the field of battle and the
field of play. How do these power-holders with set traditions, ways of
thought, habits of expression, and ways of signaling to one another cope
with the change, given that the change from the standpoint of many is
undesirable? They are, by and large, declared adherents to a doctrine.
This pride of doctrine is accompanied by a sincere as well as tactical
concern for the prestige of scientificality. So they attach much impor-
tance to the reduction not only of cognitive dissonance but of logical
dissonance. You have to preserve consistency, if necessary by appealing
to a second-order principle or even a third-order principle. The tighter
the doctrine, the harder that is to do. What Elizabeth Hardwick, in dis-
cussing certain general Protestant churches in America, called "that
mild and permeable doctrine" may accommodate revision with less
strain than would accompany revision of tighter creeds.
What varieties of response do the Soviet mandarins have to the dis-
agreeable changes? Of course defection or schism is one and we may be
seeing some of that. We may also see revision, accomplished but denied
at the same time. I suppose the most famous example of this in the
history of Russian communism is Lenin's What Is to Be Done?,20 where he
made striking reversals of Russian social democratic and Marxist doc-
trine while insisting that his was the higher orthodoxy. In France, the
detractors of Jean Monnet, who were skilled and successful mandarins,
used to manage the transition without skipping a beat. You could hardly
pinpoint the time when from knowing that what Monnet was proposing
was impossible, they smoothy shifted to saying that obviously everybody
knew that what Monnet proposed was inevitable. Walter Lippmann, a
celebrated and successful mandarin, was so sure that Dewey would
defeat Truman in 1948 that he would write columns not saying, "Here is
why I think Dewey will defeat Truman," but rather, "What is the most
important domestic priority problem facing the new Dewey administra-
tion?" After the election, Lippmann wrote a silken smooth column say-
ing, in effect, "Well, Truman won. Yes, some of us may be blamed for
predicting that Dewey would win. But the only place where we went
wrong is not that we didn't know that there were more Democrats than
Republicans, we always knew that. The only error we made, if error it
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could be called, was in not realizing how many of the Democrats would
come out to vote." That is managing defeat with aplomb.
The mandarins may also appeal to higher order principles. In 1951
or 1952, some Soviet scholars wanted to rehabilitate Freudian psycho-
therapy although Freud was a bad name in Soviet official doctrine. How
do you do it? Answer: you put Freudian psychotherapy under the wing
of an acceptable name, namely Pavlov. Very briefly, the chain was:
Pavlov is okay. Pavlov worked in the field of reflexes and secondary sig-
nal systems, so secondary signal systems are okay. Language is a secon-
dary signal system. Psychotherapists work with language. Therefore,
psychotherapy is Pavlovian. It is a little bit like the adjustments that you
can read about made by end of the world sects when the predicted date
has come and gone and alas, the world has not ended.
Or the mandarins could go on a counter-offensive. Lenin, attacked
for revisionism, says, "Who are the actual revisionists? Everybody knows
the actual revisionists are Bernstein," and so on. OrJan Palach sets fire
to himself in protest against the Warsaw Pact forces' invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968, and the Soviet authorities and press write, "Who are
the real murderers ofJan Palach?" It turns out the real murderers are
the bourgeois revanchists and interventionists, who set up unrealistic
expectations and disoriented this young man. Or when others were
debating whether the third world should pay its debts, Dr. Castro
asserted in a speech, the Europeans and North Americans with their
superior military force "had exploited the resources of the southern
hemisphere for several centuries, extracting labor, minerals and crops
while giving us nothing valuable in return. So the real truth is that we in
the third world are their creditors and they are our debtors." In other
words, you take the counter-offensive; you do not take a neutral position
or bring the ball back to the line of scrimmage, you try to throw the
other side for a loss.
You remember the submarine of the Whiskey class that was
stranded on a sand bar in Swedish internal waters around 1980. Who
was to blame? Some thought the Soviet captain was to blame, but of
course the Soviet press had its explanation: the honest navigating cap-
tain had been led astray by electronic false signals of the Swedes. This
was the 20th century equivalent of the old coastal robbers who set out
false lights and lured ships to their destruction on the rocks. So the real
international law violators were the Swedes, not the Soviets.
Or consider Sartre who in 1956 attacked Khrushchev for his revela-
tions in a secret speech not because the revelations were not true, but
because Khrushchev was at fault in not preparing the population suffi-
ciently to receive these unpleasant truths.
Or the mandarins may employ the binary organization of reality
into dyads. The Soviet quasi-official view is that reality is divided into
mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive alternatives. That is, they treat
all alternatives as if they were contradictory, as if the two contraries
occupied the entire field. Sometimes it happens that the Soviet arguer
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has to favor a policy which seems to be neither on one side nor on the
other side of the dyad. He cannot say that he favors a compromise,
because that is a rather special and limited statement, and it looks
unprincipled. So he must try to find a way to group the unacceptable
alternatives that puts both on one side of a second-order dyad, making
the alternative not between, but above the unacceptable alternatives. I
have been explaining that to my classes for years, and the other day I
was lucky enough to notice in the paper a literal confirmation of that
idea. Yeltsin had attacked Gorbachev's Party platform as unclear and
contradictory and charged that it looked as though it had been written
partly with the right hand and partly with the left. Frolov, the editor-in-
chief of Pravda, said to a reporter, "I think I can tell you that Mikhail
Gorbachev does not write either with the left hand or with the right
hand; he gives dictation."
The mandarins may also employ distinctions. If driven, you can
retreat to one distinction after another. Take the Marxist doctrine of the
immiseration of the proletariat - the idea that under capitalism the pro-
letariat is inevitably driven into deeper and deeper poverty. Suppose it
turns out that the proletariat has been growing richer, not poorer. The
first distinction is not absolute, but relative immiseration: the proleta-
riat have been growing richer, but they have not been growing richer as
fast as the rich have been growing richer. Then suppose it turns out that
inequalities have, in fact, been declining so that the curve is shallower
than it used to be and the poor have been growing richer faster than the
rich have been growing richer in percentage terms. Well, says the doc-
trine, we are talking not about the first derivative but the second deriva-
tive: they are growing richer, but not as faster richer as they used to be
growing faster richer. And if that is refuted then the next line is not
national but global: we were not talking about the poor in any given
country, we are talking about the poor in global terms, and even though
the Europeans and Americans have been growing richer at all levels and
at all speeds, it has been at the expense of the poor in other countries.
The same is true of other sorts of distinctions. For example, the prob-
lem of contradictions arising under socialism was solved by Lenin
around 1920 when he invented a distinction between antagonistic and
non-antagonistic contradictions.
The mandarins are especially smooth in periods of transition, that is
what puts them on their mettle. And this is a period of transition to
beat all other periods of transition in the Soviet Union. It is painful, but
I have confidence in the ability of Soviet mandarins to cope with the
painful transition, and I also have confidence in the ability of western
analysts of Soviet mandarins to cope with their coping with the changes.

